Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

this definition hard to understand, for we do not see that there is anything in it which could not be expressed in logistic terms. Indeed, Mr. Russell admits that if by intuition you mean the discovery of a new indefinable, you are consistent enough. M. Boutroux also accuses Mr. Russell of not getting all the detailed results of mathematics. The latter replies (justly, we think) that when you have defined a class like number intensionally, you have essentially deduced all the particular numbers: the general rule being given, that is enough. He accuses M. Boutroux in turn of confusing intension with extension. If the extension is not completely deduced, the intension may be: the latter alone is the subject-matter of mathematics. Again, M. Boutroux is said to confuse the act of discovery with the thing discovered. The thing discovered may be an object of intuition even while it is discovered by means of logistic processes. Of course; but is intuition after all essentially different from logistic proof? It seems unimportant, how we are led to discover a truth; the important question is, do the truths discovered, when reduced to lowest terms, show mutual independence, or are they logically dependent upon a small number of concepts and axioms? It is this connectedness or disconnectedness that we want to discover, and if logistic has shown that the complex 'subject-matter of exact thought' stands upon a very few simple truths, it has done a great thing. The real problems for discussion are, we think, not the issue between logical intuition and logical deduction, but the philosophical presuppositions of logistic, and the correctness of the definitions and deductions it contains.

W. H. SHELDON.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. November, 1905, Bd. 40, Heft 4. *Ueber das Verstehen von Worten und Sätzen* (pp. 225–251): CLIFTON O. TAYLOR. – By observing the introspection of a number of subjects in the comprehension of various texts and in the solution of problems, the following conclusions are reached: The comprehension of sentences of concrete content may be aided by the development of congruent imagery. These auxiliary images become less frequent as the matters treated of in the text are more familiar. The comprehension of sentences of abstract content is not facilitated by such imagery, but rather hindered. Pauses not occupied by special experiences appear necessary to comprehension. The influence of context may aid in comprehension without the appearance in consciousness of any special contextual experience. *Die Orientierung der Brieftauben* (pp. 252–279): G. H. SCHNEIDER. – The problem to which this study was limited was whether the carrier-pigeon possesses an innate sense of direction, or whether it is guided by the eye, and in this case what factors in topography and the like are significant. The method was to release pigeons of varying ages at different distances, and under varying topographic conditions, and to note the time and nature of the flight homeward. The conclusion is that there is no innate sense of direction. Young pigeons find their way home even at short distances with great difficulty, and often require days to return, and in many cases they never do return. Groups of houses and valleys seem to be the chief guides. The nature of the flight varies widely. If the home environment is clearly seen, the flight is in a straight line. When the home environment can not be seen, and the direction is unknown, the pigeon flies about for some time in a circle. When two villages similar in appearance to the home environment are seen, the flight alternates for a long time back and forth. This study was made by Dr. Schneider in 1886 at the suggestion of the Prussian Ministry of War. *Literaturbericht.*

REVISTA FILOSOFICA. November–December, 1905. *La Finalità della vita* (pp. 589–621): B. VARISCO. – A defense of final causes in biology and a criticism of Reinke's 'Philosophie der Botanik.' In opposition to Reinke, Varisco holds that a living organism has something—life—not found in inorganic nature. In physiology neither causality nor finality can be ignored. To overlook finality is to overlook the organism. Indeed, in the case of organisms finality is much more evident and certain than causality. *La Sociologia e l'insegnamento Secondario e superiore* (pp. 622–648): A. PAGANO. – The majority of those Italians who guide the political affairs of their country receive their education under one of the faculties of law in an Italian university. Their previous education has been chiefly literary, their university training is chiefly 'legal.' In both they are provided with traditional conceptions for deductive application to present conditions which the student has not been properly fitted to understand. Literary training should not be diminished, but it should be so selected and combined with the study of history broadly conceived, that the student becomes acquainted with the geneses and tendencies of the social forces with which the lawmaker has to reckon. *Sul Nietzsche* (pp. 649–668): A. FRANZONI. – A review of recent works on *Nietzsche. Rassegna Bibliografica* (pp. 669–717). *Necrologio:* Romualdo Bobba; Vincenzo Lilla.

Arréat, Lucien. *Art et psychologie individuelle.* Paris: Felix Alcan. 1906. Pp. vii + 158. 2.50 fr.

Binet, Alfred. *L'âme et le corps.* Paris: Ernest Flammarion. 1905. Pp. 288.

Boulanger and Hermant. *Association des idées chez les idiots et les imbeciles.* Ghent. 1906. Pp. 138.

Cassirer, Ernst. *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit.* Erster Band. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer. 1906. Pp. viii + 608.

Edmunds, W. *Sound and Rhythm, and Box of Models of the Human Ear.* London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox. 1906. Pp. xii + 96. 2s. 6d.

Gramier, Camille. *La femme criminelle.* Paris: Octave Doin. 1906. Pp. 468.

Grasset. *Le psychisme inférieur.* Paris: Chevalier and Rivière. 1906. Pp. 516. 9 fr.

Haeckel, Ernst. *Darwinism and the Problems of Life.* Translated by Joseph McCabe. London: A. N. Owen and Co. 1906. 6s.

Hoffman, Abraham. *René Descartes.* Stuttgart: Fromann. 1905. Pp. x + 194. 2 M.

Hyslop, James H. *Enigmas of Psychical Research.* Boston: Herbert B. Turner and Co. 1906. Pp. x + 427.

Loeb, Jacques. *Dynamics of Living Matter.* New York: The Macmillan Co. 1906. $3 net.

NOTES AND NEWS

A. H. BUCHERER, writing from the University of Bonn to the *Athenæum* (of March 24), makes the following observations in the course of his rather technical communication. "It is the fate of all important physical theories that, after inaugurating a period of brilliant discoveries, they are taken to task by an array of new experimental facts, accruing from the continually refining process of our methods of observation. The Maxwellian theory has not been exempt from this fate. It is the absence of the effects of the annual motion of the earth through the ether on terrestrial optics, and in general on terrestrial electromagnetic phenomena, that causes so much difficulty, and it is to-day the foremost aim of all theorists working in the field of electromagnetism to find a plausible hypothesis accounting for this absence, which has been established to an astounding degree of accuracy. To speak strictly, the Maxwellian theory in its original form can not offer any explanation, and we have to turn to its natural outgrowth, the electronic theory. It can be shown that, unless the structure of matter undergoes a certain change by moving through the ether, the negative results of all the experiments undertaken with the view of discovering the influnce mentioned would be incomprehensible. Now, whenever we appeal to the structure of matter for an explanation of electromagnetic phenomena, we really appeal to the electrons of which we consider matter to consist. . . . An electron at rest is a small charged sphere of a diameter of about one-ten-billionth part of a centimeter, the electric charge residing on the surface or being distributed in the interior. The electric force of this electron is easily expressed by applying the ordinary laws of electrostatics. If we impart a uniform motion to the electron we must assume the laws of flowing electricity. For the motion of a charge constitutes an electric current, and to start this with its magnetic field a certain expenditure of energy is required. We can view this electromagnetic energy in the light of the ordinary kinetic energy of masses, and ascribe it to some ideal mass of the electron, which is then termed its electromagnetic mass. There is this